PROGRESS" OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS

SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
BANKRUPTCY.

In re Fife, io9 Fed. 88o, the United States District Court
(W. D. Pennsylvania) holds that where in an action for
breach of promise of marriage a verdict was
Brch o
Promise of
recovered before the defendant filed his petition
Matrrige
in bankruptcy, on which judgment was entered
before he applied for his discharge, such claim was provable
under the Sixty-third Section of the Bankrupt Act, since it
was founded on a contract and reduced to judgment after
the filing of his petition and before the consideration of his
application for a discharge.
A mortgage given by a partnership on its property is not
affected by bankruptcy proceedings against one of the partPutnershlp ners alone, though after*the giving of the mortgage, the firm was dissolved, and such partner
took its assets and assumed its liabilities: United States District Court (E. D. North Carolina). In re Sanderlin, lO9
Fed. 857.
Where a bankrupt knowingly made false statements of
his assets or liabilities in reports made to commercial
agencies, a wholesale dealer, who sold him.goods
False
Statements by on credit in reliance on such reports, is entitled
Bankrupt

to rescind the sale and recover the goods, with-

out regard to whether or not the statements were made with
fraudulent intent; but it is essential to such right of rescission that the credit should have been induced by the false
statements, and, but for them, would not have been extended: United States District Court (W. D. Arkansas,
E. D.). In re Epstein, 1O9 Fed. 874.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
BROKERS.

Where-a broker employed to .procure a purchaser is discharged before producing a purchaser at the terms authorized, such broker is' not entitled to any comCommission.,
When
pensation: Cadigan v.. Crabtree, 61 N. E. 37
Earned
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts).
BURDEN OF PROOV.

The Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee holds in
Major v. Stone's River National Bank, 64 S.W. 352, that
Iwhere
the cashier of a bank, being indebted
thereto, pledged notes as collateral, and afterDirector
wards, being indebted to a director, pledged the
same notes to him, without the knowledge or consent of the
bank, such director cannot be held to be an innocent purchaser of such collateral, without positive evidence that he
did not know Of the original pledge to the bank, and that
he loaned his money to the cashier on the faith of the collateral. "Two officers of the bank," says the court, "dealing with each other; and using the bank's collateral for their
own purposes, would have to show by clear and positive evidence their own good faith."
CONDITIONAL SAL.

With one judge dissenting, the New York Supreme Court
(Appellate Division, Third Department) holds, in Gray v.
Booth, 71 N. Y. S ipp. 1O15, that where a donPayment
by
tract for the sale of personalty provides that title
Installments shall not pass until full payment of installments
of the purchase price, the vendor may maintain a suit for
each installment as it falls due.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The United States Circuit Court (D. Massachusetts)
holds, in Haverhill Gaslight Company v. Barker, 1O9 Fed.
694, that a suit by a gas company against a gas
Suit
AaInsta
commission created by the state, and the attorState
ney general, who is charged by the statute with
-the duty of enforcing the orders of the commission by proceedings in the court, to enjoin threatened proceedings to
-enforce such an order, and to have it decided void as in violation of a right, of the complainant under the Constitution
of the United States, is not a suit against the state within
the meaning 6f the Eleventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
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CONTRACTS.

Where the plaintiff contracted to sell to the defendant a
certain quantity of peaches from certain orchards, and because of drought less than that quantity was
Breach,
F'alure of
grown, the defendant cannot recover damages
Crop
for failure to deliver the quantity specified:
Supreme Court of California in Ontario etc. Association v.
Cutting Fruit-PackingCo., 66 Pac. 28. The court allows
the plaintiff to recover for peaches furnished and accepted
under the contract, but refuses to allow the defendant to set
off his damages due to the alleged breach.
CORPORATIONS.

Against the dissent of two judges, the Supreme Court of
California holds, in Yule v. Bishop, 65 Pac. 1O94, that where
Stoholdirs' a note given by a corporation is paid by a surety
Uabilty to

thereon, such surety may recover the amount

paid fr6m the stockholders at the time the payment was made, but not from the stockholders at the time
the note was given, who had parted with their stock, since,
it is held by the majority of the court, the debt is not on the
note, but for money paid for the corporation's benefit.
The question of what relation a director of a corporation
sustains to the business thereof, becomes important in the
case of People v. Supreme Tent of the MaccaRelation of
Director
bees of the World, 71 N. Y. Supp. 960, where it
tothe
appeared that the by-laws of a fraternal order
Business
provided that no person' who is engaged as
"principal, agent or servant" in the manufacture or sale of
malt liquors shall become a member. The New York
Supreme Court (Special Term, Monroe County) holds that
this does not render ineligible the director of a corporation
engaged in manufacturing and selling malt liquors, since
he is in no sense a principal, agent, or servant in the transaction of the business of his corporation.
Surety

DAMAGES.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds, in Denhard v.
Hirst, 64 S. W. 393, that if manufacturers selling carpets
know that the buyer intends to sell them at
Knowledge
of
retail, the measure of damages for the failure
Contracting of the sellers to deliver the carpets is the profits

the buyer would have made if they had been
delivered; but if the sellers do not know that the carpets are
Party
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to be res~ld at retail, the measure of damages is the difference
between the contract price and the market value bf the goods
at the time and place of delivery. "The profits which one
reasonably and reliably anticipates from the possession and
manipulation of the goods bought are considered as much
a part of the contract of sale as the claim to any actual
increase in value at the time of delivery over the contract
price, and hence the prevailing rule of 'law lermits the reIcovery of such profits as special or consequential damages.' t
DECIEDENT'S ESTATES.

A tendency in the courts to depart somewhat from the
harsh attitude of the common law towards illegitimate chilCilet

dren appears in Morton's Estate, 87 N. W. 182,
unanimously that an illegitimate child, whose

where the Supreme Court of Nebraska holds

parents, before his .death, intermarry, and have other children, and whose father has adopted him into .his family by
admitting and receiving him into his family, and has given
him his family name and acknowledged and recognized him
as a child, is adopted into the family in fact, and is entitled
to share as a legitimate child, where. there is a devise to the
children "share and share alike." The statute providing for
such legitimatization by adoption is construed as intending
an adoption in fact and not an adoption in law.
DIVORCE.

In McGean v. McGean, 49 Atl. lO83, five justices of the

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey dissent from
the proposition that a case of obstinate desertion
Deseeron
is not made out against the husband, if it appears
that the separation was not against the will of the wife.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

In re Delafleld, lo9 Fed. 577, the United States Circuit
Court (W. D. Pennsylvania) holds that the passby
Condemnation age of an ordinance by a city, authorized
Ordinance
statute to condemn land for public purposes,
stating its election to appropriate certain property, amourlts to a present taking of such property, and
entitles the landowner to institute proceedings to recover
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compensation therefor; and the city cannot delay such proceedings by failing to file the bond required by the statute
as a condition precedent to its taking possession or instituting proceedings on its own part to have the damages
assessed.
ESTOPPETL.

A married woman, who makes a nuncupative will by public act, which recites that certain property acquired during
the marriage in the name of the husband is his
separate property, isnot thereby estopped to
p
l
assert the contrary: Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Succession of Muller, 30 Southern, 329.
That abutting owners on a stream have not objected
to the use of the stream as a sewer, does not estop them
from objecting where the city proposes to inPollution of
crease such sewer: Gale v. City of Syracuse,
Stream
N. Y. Supp. 986, New Ycrk Supreme Court
(Special Term, Onondaga County).
EVIDENCE,

The well-known Federal Statute, which authorizes courts
of the United States, in actions at law, on motion and due
Requiring notice, to require parties to produce books or
Productionol writings which contain evidence pertinent to
Documents
the issue "in cases and under circumstances
where they might be compelled to produce the same by the
ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery," is held in Owyhee
Land and IrrigationCo. v. Tautphans, lO9 Fed. 547, to go
no further than to apply to actions at law the remedy which,
in equity, is afforded by a bill of discovery; and, before a
defendant can be held in default for a failure to produce
such evidence as is provided by the statute, the court must
have determined that the evidence so sought is pertinent to
the issues and ought to be produced, and have made an
order for its production which has been disobeyed.
EXECUTION.

Where a firm recovered judgment on a debt due it, and
thereafter one of the partners died, the executrix of the
DethofOne deceased partnermay join with the survivor in
Plaintiff

application for leave to issue execution after

five years: New York Supreme Court (Special Term).
re Armstrong, 71' N. Y. Supp. 951.

In
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FIXTURES.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine holds, in Readfield
'Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.. Cyr, 49 Ati. IO47, that as
TCmanhone

between debtor and creditor the posts of a telephone company, with the wires and insulators
thereon, continue to retain their character as

chattels, and may be seized and sold on execution as personal
property. "In determining the question of whether a chattel
has become so affixed to the realty as 'to become accessory
to it and form a part and parcel of it, the modern and most
approved rule is to give special prominence to the intention
of the party making the annexation-not his hidden, secret
intention, but the intention which the law deduces from such
external facts as the structure and mode of the attachment,
the purpose and use for which the ahnexation has been made,
and the relation and situation of the party making it."
FOREIGN MARRIAGE.

A marriage by ,a Russian Jew in Russia with his niece,
though lawful in Russia, will not be recognized as valid in
Pennsylvania, where a continuance of the relaValidit
tion would expose the parties to indictment in
the criminal courts; United States District Court (E. D.
Pennsylvania) in U. S. ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, IO9 Fed.
886.
FRAUD.

In.an Action upon a contract for the production of a play;
the evidence is insufficient to sustain fraud on the part of the
,,preson
of
Opinion

plaintiff, because he stated in good faith that he

had the exclusive right to produce such play in

England, when in fact the play was public prop-

erty, such statement, the court holding, being merely an expression of opinion upon a difficult- question of law: New
York Supreme Court (Special Term, New York County)
in Brady v. Edwards, 71 N. Y. Supp. 972.
The parties were partners in certain mining enterprises,
and jointly owned an interest in a mining claim, in which
Concealment
of value,
Partners

complainant also owned a separate interest. The

defendants, by tunneling from an adjoining

mine, managed by them, discovered an extensive

and valuable vein of ore in such claim, and, concealing such
fact from complainant; procured an option on his interest,
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and execution and delivery in escrow of a deed therefor, and
afterwards by fraud, and without payment therefor, obtained
possession of the deed. The United States Circuit Court of
Appeals holds, in Hanley v. Sweeny, 1O9 Fed. 712, that such
deed should be set aside as fraudulent and void, both because
of such concealment and because never delivered.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

A husband fraudulently conveyed his goods to his wife
and another, and such other conveyed to the defendant, who
Husband and purchased in good faith, and formed a partnerWife,
ship with the wife. Subsequently after notice
Subsequent
of the fraud and of pending actions to set aside
Purchaser
the conveyance, the goods of the partnership
were transferred to a corporation organized for the purpose,
and in which the niembers of the partnership were the principal stockholders. Under these facts the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth Department)
holds, against the dissent of two judges, that the corporation, having purchased with notice, was bound by the judgments subsequently recovered in the creditors' actions adjudging the conveyance void: Varnum v. Behn, 71 N. Y.
Supp. 903. The receiver, it is held, was entitled to judgment
against the corporation for the amount of the wife's interest
in the partnership at the time it was transferred to the corporation and against the wife individually for the value of
the property conveyed to her by the husband, but to no judgment against the wife's partner individually.
INSURANCE.

A member of a fraternal society took a certificate of life
insurance payable to B., "as his fianc6e." On his death the
fund was claimed by B. and also by a deserted
Fraud,
waiver by
wife of the insured. The society deposited the
Society
fund in court, and the claimants interpleaded.
Upon these facts, the Supreme Court of California holds, in
Woodmen of the World v, Rutledge, 65 Fac. 1105, that since
the society had waived all question of fraud and claim to
the money, the wife cannot object that B. was not entitled to
it because the insured was incapable of contracting marriage
at the time of the engagement to B.

LIZ,
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JURISDICTION.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) holds, in Excelsior Wooden.Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge
Co., IO9 Fed. 497, that, while a circuit court
Federal
dismisses a case on the ground that it has no
do.,s
jurisdiction, leaving 1iending motions undetermined, the only issue reviewable is that of jurisdiction, which
must be taken to the Supreme Court, and an appeal will not
.
I
lie to the circuit court of appeals.
A federal court is without jurisdiction of a suit to enforce
a lien against a railroad in favor of a partnership, brought
by the plaintiff as one of the partners, and as
Suit by
assignee of his co-partner, unless it is shown
Amignee
that the citizenship of the assignor is such that
the suit could have been maintained in that court by the
firm: United States Circuit Court (D. Oregon) in Barr v.
Columbia Southern Ry. Co., IO9 Fed. 501.
The same court holds, in Johnson v. Ford, io9 Fed. 501,
that a federal court is without jurisdiction of a suit by a
legatee against an executor, the purpose of
stit by
Leg.tee
which is to secure the appointment of a receiver
against
for the property of the estate, which is in proExewutor cess of administration in a probate court of the
state, on the ground that the defendant has not included all
the property in his inventory, and has been guilty of fraud
and collusion to the detriment of the estate. In such matters
the jurisdiction of the probate court is exclusive though the*
plaintiff is a citizen of one state and the executor of another.
The court iefuses to follow Richardson v. Grfeen, 9 C. C. A.
565, and distinguishes Payne v. Hook, 7 Wallace, 425.
LIMITATIONS.

The Supreme Judicial Court of lalassachusetts holds, in
Pearson v. Treadwell, 6I N. E. 44, that where the trustees
under a will have in their hands undivided intrts,

come of the trust funds, an agreement entered

into between the beneficiaries determining their
respective rights to such income, and declaring it to be their
property in certain proportions, does not remove such income
fund from the -trust so as to make such trustees simple
debtors, and, start limitations running against a claim therefor.

PROGRESS OF THR LAW.
OBSTRUCTION OF OFFICZR.

The Georgia Code contains a provision, very similar to the
law of the other states of the Union, providing that it is a
misdemeanor to "knowingly and wilfully obWhat
Amounts to

struct or oppose any officer of this state, or other

person duly authorized, in serving or attempting to serve or
execute any lawful process or order." In Vince v. State,
39 S. E. 435, the Supreme Court of that state, construing
this provision, and reversing the decision of the court below,
holds that merely refusing, upon the demand of a levying
officer, to unlock a door of a house in order to enable him to
enter the same for the purpose of levying a lawful process
upon goods contained therein, is not a violation of this provision. The similarity of the Georgia legislation to that of
other states gives to the case a more than local interest.
PINCIPAL AND AGENT.

A decision of apparently wide effect is made by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit) in Central
Exchange of Chicago v. Bendinger, iO9 Fed.
Trustee
926. In that case it appeared that the plaintiff
Dc Tt
had intrusted money to an agent for tho purchase of certain bonds. The agent, without the knowledge
or consent of the plaintiff, deposited the money from time
to time with the defendant, which conducted a "bucket
shop," as margins to cover gambling transactions which
were illegal and void, and constituted misdemeanors under
the laws of the state. Subsequently the defendant paid to
the agent certain sums as profits which the agent converted
to his own use. The remaining margins were lost in the
deals. The court holds that the defendant, having received
the money illegally, became at once a trustee de son tort, and
liable to the plaintiff for the entire amount, notwithstanding
it had no knowledge of actual ownership; and that its repayment of sums to the agent, who had already violated his
trust, was not a restitution to the plaintiff, of which it could
avail itself as a defense, even pro tanto.
PROPERTY RIGHT IN MARKET QUOTATIONS.

The furnishing by a board of trade of market quotations,
made upon the transactions of its exchange to customers for
Publication their exclusive'use, either by means of a ticker,
or by placing them on a blackboard in the customers' office, is not such a publication as dfprives the board
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PROPERTY RIGHT IN MARXEIT QUOTATIONS (Coatinued).

of its property right therein, and it is entitled to the protection of such right by an injunction prohibiting. the use of
such quotations without its authority, and before their publication to a third party, to whom they are furnished by one
who obtains them surreptitiously: United States Circuit.
Court (E. D. Wisconsin) in' Board of Trade of Chicago v.
Hadden-Krull Co., lo 9 Fed. 705.
RAILROADS.

A railroad company's excavation disturbed the foumfat*pn
of an adjacent church edifice. In 1882 a settlementftas
Exevatwons,
DnmageA,

Limitations

made, whereby the company erected a retaii.ng.
wall for the protection of the church property,
and paid for repairs on the building, taking a

receipt acknowledging such payment in full settlement and
discharge of all damages done to the church, adding that the
company was to pay for all work in progress. In 1887, the
church sustained damages arising from the failure of the wall
to sustain the vibration by running trains, for which damage
suit was instituted in 1891. Under these.circumstances the
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey holds that the
injury for which the suit was brought was entirely distinct
from that arising from the first excavation, and was not embraced in the original settlement. The injury for which the
suit was brought being in this view a new cause of action,
arising in 1887, limitations began to run from that date.
Five judges dissent. Church of the Holy Communion v.
PatersonExtension Railway Co., 49 Atl. 1O3O.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY.

The decisions arising in connection with questions as to
a man's right "to be let alone" possess interest, as showing a
Likenesses,
Use for
Adver ting

development of a branch of law as yet in a for-

mative condition. The tendency of the courts is
apparently to protect a man in his right of privacy, and this appears where, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 71 N. Y. Supp. 876, the defendants without
authority published and posted in conspicuous places a large
number of lithographic prints of the plaintiff, with advertisements of their business -thereon. This she alleged made her
a subject of scoffs and jeers, and caused her humiliation and
distress of mind, and she sued not only to restrain such publi-
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-

cation and use of her picture, but also f6r damages,and upon
a demurrer to her complaint, the court overrules the demurrer,
holds the-cause of action maintainable for both purposes on
the ground that the defendants have by the alleged acts invaded the plaintiff's right of privacy. The court does not
regard the publication as libelous, but holds the action maintainable on the principle which it puts in this language:
"The cause of action arises in such a case from the fact that
the defendant has violated the right of personal immunity
-the right not to be interfered with to his damage or
danger or discomfort." The court makes an interesting,
but by no means exhaustive, review of the subject.
SALES.

Where a note to a bank is secured by a trust deed, executed
to stockholders and directors of the bank as trustees, and
Validity
at the sale under the deed the bank is purchaser,
the sale is not, for these reasons, void : Supreme
Court of California in Sacramento Bank v. Copsey, 66
Pac. 8."
SALE OF GROWING TREES.

It has become settled law, says the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine in Emerson v. Shores, 49 Atl. 1051, by the great
Interet
InLand,
Cntr-at,
Cofstru~flon

weight of
tracts for
to be cut
purchaser,

authority, that parol or simple conthe sale of growing wood or timber,
and removed from the land by the
are not to be construed by the parties

as intended to convey any interest in the land, but as executory contracts for the sale of the "timber after it shall have
been severed from the soil and converted into chattel property, together with a license to enter-upon land for the purpose of cutting and removing it. And while the license to
enter and cut timber, thus created by parol or simple contracts, the court says, is irrevocable as to that part of the
timber which has been severed from the land in execution of
the contract, yet while it remains executory, as to the wood
or timber not yet severed from the land, it is revocable not
only at the will of the owner, but by his death or by his
conveyance of the land without reservation.

PROGRESS OF THE L.kwo
SPNDTHRIPT TRUST.

In Murphy v. Delano, 49 AtI. 1053, it appeared that trustees were authorized by the will of a testator to tutrn over the
whole estate to his son after he became thirty
Agreement
years of age, if, in their judgment, it would be
between
for the best interest of the son and his heirs for
Trustees
and Cestut
him to "have possession and control of the
whole of said residue." But it appeared from the terms
of a trust deed from the trustees to the son that, in their
judgment, it was not for his interest to have control of
the entire property, for the deed continued in the trustees the
control of $25,000 of the estate, and attempted to protect

the income payable to the son against either alienation by
him or attachment by his creditors. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine holds that such a stipulation whereby the
son became absolutely entitled to receive one-fourth of the
income quarterly is not in conformity with the terms of the
trust, and, if held operative, would have the effect to defeat
the manifest purpose of the testator by making this income
subject to the claims of creditors.
TELEGRA.

The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Waselbaurn, 39 S. E. 443, that while the
sendee of a telegraphic message has a right of
Sendee's
Rights
action against the company for any damages he
Conitons

may sustain in consequence of its negligence in

the transmission of a message to him, he is bound by the
reasonable terms of the contract made between the company
and the sender of the message.
TRIkL.

In Yori v. Cohn, 65 Pac. 945, the Supreme Court of
Nevada holds that where a defendant, relying on promises of
Continuance, material witnesses, living without the state, who
where not served with process, that they would
Absent
be present at the trial, fails to take their deposiWitness
tions, a continuance will be allowed on an affidavit showing
that they are prevented from attending by sickness. . The
Chief Justice dissents on the ground that, just as a litigant
may not rely on the promise of a witness within the jurisdiction, but should serve him with process, so a litigant sl .'-
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TRIAL (Continued).

take the deposition of a witness without the jurisdiction and
his reliance on promises to be present will not entitle him to
a continuance. The majority, on the other hand, hold that
due diligence was used.
TRUSTIES.

The growing custom of newspapers to solicit contributions through their columns for various charities of current
interest renders important and interesting the
Apportionnent of
decision of the Supreme Court of California in
Contributions Hallinanv. Hearst,66 Pac. 17. It is there held
that the publisher in such case becomes a voluntary trustee of
the funds, charged with devoting them to the objects indicated in the solicitations. The question in what proportion
such moneys are to be distributed among the advertised
beneficiaries is, in. the first instance, to be decided by such
publisher, with which decision the courts will not interefere
except in case of gross abuse.

